ABSTRACT Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising cryptographic tool for data owner (DO) to realize fine-grained date sharing in the cloud computing. In the encryption of most existing ABE schemes, a substantial number of modular exponentiations are often required; the computational cost of it is growing linearly with the complexity of the access policy. Besides, in the most existing ABE with outsourced decryption, the computation cost of generating transformation key is growing linearly with the number of attributes associated with user private key; these computations are prohibitively high for mobile device users, which becomes a bottleneck limiting its application. To address the above issues, we propose a secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation in one single untrusted server model and a new method to generate the transformation key. Based on these techniques and Brent Waters's ciphertext-policy ABE scheme, we propose an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced both encryption and decryption, which can securely outsource encryption and decryption to untrusted encryption service provider (ESP) and decryption service provider (DSP), respectively, leaving only a constant number of simple operations for the DO and eligible users to perform locally. In addition, both DO and the eligible users can check the correctness of results returned from the ESP and the DSP with a probability, respectively. Finally, we provide the experimental evaluation and security analysis of our scheme, which indicates that our construction is suitable for the mobile environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the network, it frequently happens that sensitive data must be archived by storage server in a way that the specific users could be allowed to access it. Besides, with the development of cloud computing, data security is the main obstacle that impedes cloud computing from wide adoption. The reason is that user's data is stored in a public cloud, which is maintained and operated by untrusted cloud service provider. To address this problem, Sahai and Waters [1] proposed the access model such as ABE, which is a mechanism that enables data owner(DO) to encrypt data using access polices to realize fine-grained data sharing in the cloud computing. ABE schemes are divided into two categories: ciphertext-policy ABE(CP-ABE) [2] , [3] and key-policy ABE(KP-ABE) [4] . In CP-ABE, the access policy is embedded into the ciphertext, while in the KP-ABE, the access policy assigned in private key. In CP-ABE, a user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if only if the set of attributes associated with the user's the private key satisfies the access policy associated with the ciphertext. In KP-ABE, a user is able to decrypt a ciphertext if only if the set of attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfies the access policy associated with the user's the private key.
Nevertheless, one of the main efficiency drawbacks of the most exiting ABE schemes is that the computational cost in the encryption and decryption phases is expensive. In the most existing ABE schemes, the encryption operations are mainly modular exponentiations, which grows with the complexity of the access policy. In the mobile cloud computing [5] and fog computing [6] , [7] , mobile device has limited computation ability to independently complete basic encryption to protect sensitive data residing in public cloud. Considering an application scenario that a DO wants to share his data to specific person without a desktop at hand, how to complete the encryption effectively. To address this issue, outscourced ABE, which provides a way to outsource intensive computing task during encryption to server provider without revealing data was introduced in [8] and [9] .
Beyond the encryption outsourced, in the most existing ABE schemes, the decryption computation are mainly pairing operations, which also grows with the complexity of the access policy, Green et al. [10] proposed a remedy to this problem by introducing the notion of ABE with outsourced decryption, which largely eliminates the decryption overhead for users. However, in the most existing ABE schemes with outsourced decryption [10] - [12] , the user has to deal with a number of computations when he wants to outsource the decryption to a decryption service provider(DSP). More precisely, the user has to generate a transformation key to DSP, but yet generation of the transformation key requires certain modular exponentiations computation, which grows linearly with the number of attributes associated with user private key. Moreover, in most of existing ABE schemes, if one attribute of user is revoked or added at any time, thus the private key requires key-update at user, then the transformation key has to be updated simultaneously, while the computation tasks cannot be performed effectively by resource-constrained mobile users. All of these heavy tasks on DO or user side would make it an efficiency bottleneck in the access control system.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
Aim at eliminating the most overhead computation on both the data owner and the user side, we propose an outsourced ABE scheme not only supporting outsourced decryption but also outsourced encryption. Firstly, we propose a secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation in one untrusted server model, which can allow user to securely outsource variable-exponent variable-base exponentiations(u a or u a 1 u b 2 ) to just one untrusted computation server, and user can efficiently check whether the computation is computed correctly or not. Then based on this type of algorithm, we present an ABE with verifiable outsourced encryption, it not only shifts the burdensome modular exponentiation computation task from DO to ESP, but also DO can check the correctness of the calculation done by ESP.
In addition, we consider the outsourced decryption in the proposed ABE with verifiable outsourced encryption, we propose a new approach which can reduce the transformation key generation cost to be constant. Above all, we present an ABE with verifiable outsourced both encryption and decryption(ABE-VOED) which can shift the burdensome encryption and decryption computation task of DO and user to ESP and DSP, respectively. Following our techniques, computation efficiency is achieved at both the DO and user side.
At last, we implement the ABE-VOED to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme and present the proof of our scheme. The software used by us is based on the CP-ABE implementation in the libfenc library [13] . The comparison of performance between other ABE schemes and ABE-VOED given in section VI indicates that our ABE scheme is more suitable for the mobile environment.
B. RELATED WORK 1) ABE WITH OUTSOURCED COMPUTATION
As mentioned above, due to the decryption computation cost grows linearly with the complexity of the access policy in general ABE schemes [14] - [17] . To address this problem, previous work focus on how to reduce the computation burden of the users, Attrapadung et al. [18] proposed a scheme which has short ciphertext so as to reduce the cost of the decryption, while Green et al. [10] first proposed shift the decryption task from user to a server, then user can decrypt the ciphertext by only do a little amount of multiplication calculations. In fact, it delegates all the pairing operations to a decryption service provider(DSP). Lai et al. [11] and Lin et al. [12] considered the verifiability of the cloudąŕs transformation, then they proposed a method to check the correctness of the transformation and presented concrete ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption, respectively. Nevertheless, in the above ABE schemes with outsouorced decryption, the computation cost of transformation key is growing with the the number of the attributes associated with user's private key, this is a computational burden for mobile device user.
In general, most existing ABE schemes require a large number of modular exponentiations on the DO side in the encryption phase. In order to reduce the computing cost on the user side, especially mobile user. How to securely outsource this kind of expensive computations has drew considerable attention from theoretical researchers. The methods in [19] - [21] focus on how to securely outsource algebra computations. Another method is the fully homomorphic encryption(FHE), however, even if the privacy of the input and output can be preserved by it, the computational overhead is still huge and impractical. They are not suitable for reliving ABE computational overhead of exponentiation at DO side. Li et al. [8] and Zhou and Huang [9] proposed an outsourced ABE construction with delegated encryption, but they cannot verify the correctness of calculation results done by cloud service provider.
2) SECURELY OUTSOURCING EXPONENTIATIONS
The research of the securely outsourcing computations in the cryptographic community has been drawing widespread attention. Hehenberger and Lysyanskaya [22] are the first to propose the secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation based on the two previous approaches of precomputation [23] , [24] and server-aided computation [19] , [25] . The outsourcing algorithms of variable-exponent fixedbase and the fixed-exponent varies-base exponentiation in one untrusted server model are considered in [25] and [26] , which presented an algorithm of outsourcing these two types of exponentiations in the two non-collusion untrusted model. Since the servers are not trusted by the outsourcers, then the outsource-secure algorithms of variable-exponent variablebase exponentiations in one-malicious version of two program model are proposed by [27] , in which one server is trusted, and will not collude with the other dishonest one. Wang et al. [28] first proposed a secure outsourcing algorithm for variable-exponent variable-base multi-exponentiations in one untrusted computation server model, in which the probability of verifying correctness needs to be improved.
C. ORGANIZATION
Our paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are provided in section II. In section III, we present a new secure outsourcing algorithm of modular exponentiations and its security analysis. The formal definition and the security model for our scheme is given in section IV. We present concrete ABE Scheme with Verifiable Outsourced both Encryption and Decryption(ABE-VOED) in section V. We also present the security analysis and the experimental evaluation in the section VI. Finally, a conclusion will be presented in section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR MAPS
Let G and G T be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, g is a generator of the group G, A bilinear mapping e: G × G −→ G T satisfies following properties:
• Nondegeneracy:e(g,g) = 1.
• Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g a ,g b ), ∀g∈ G, ∀a, b ∈ Z * p B. ACCESS STRUCTURES [29] Let P = {P 1 , P 2 ...P N }, A collection A ⊆ 2 P is monotone if ∀ , , if ∈ A and ⊆ , then ∈ A. An access structure (respectively, monotone structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of {P 1 , P 2 ...P n }, i.e., A ⊆ 2 P \{∅}. The sets in A are called the authored sets, and the sets not in A are called unauthorized sets.
C. DECISIONAL PARALLEL BILINEAR DIFFE-HELLMAN EXPONENT ASSUMPTION [3]
The definition of the decisional q-parallel Bilinear DiffieHellman Exponent problem as follows. Choose a group G of prime order p according to the security parameter. Let a, s, b 1 , ..., b q ∈ Z p be chosen at random and g be a generator of G. If an adversary is given
An algorithm B that outputs z∈{0, 1} has advantage in
Definition 1:
We say that the (decision) q-parallel BDHE assumption holds if no polynomial time algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem.
D. LINEAR SECRET SHARING SCHEMES (LSSS)
A secret-sharing scheme over a set of parties P is called linear(over Z p ) if:
1. The shares of the parties form a vector over Z p .
2. There exists a matrix an M with rows and n columns called the share-generating matrix for . The function ρ which maps each row of the matrix to an associated party. For all i = 1, ..., , the value ρ(i) is the party associated with row i. When we consider the column vector v = (s, r 2 , ...r n ), where s ∈ Z p is the secret to be shared, and r i ∈ Z p are random chosen for i = 2, ...n, then Mv is the vector of shares of the secret s according to . The share (Mv) i belongs to party ρ(i).
As shown in [32] , the LSSS has the property of linear reconstruction, it is to say if S∈A, then there exist constants
where {λ i } are valid shares of any secret s according to , I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}.
As described in [3] , if an unauthorized set of S, the target vector (1,0,0...0) is not in the span of the rows of the set I , Moreover, it exist a vector ω satisfies that ω · (1, 0, 0...0) and ω · M i =0 for all i ∈ I .
E. DEFINITION OF OUTSOURCE-SECURITY
In this section, we review the formal definitions for secure outsourcing of a cryptographic algorithm [27] , [28] .
An algorithm Alg to be outsourced is divided into two parts, a trusted part T which is a carried by a outsourcer, and an untrusted part U which is invoked by T . T U denotes that T implements Alg by invoking U . Supposing that T is given oracle access to an adversary U (instead of U ), the adversary U can not learn anything interesting about the input and output of T U , Following the same notations in [27] and [28] , we introduce the formal definitions for secure outsourcing of a cryptographic algorithm.
Definition 2 (Algorithm With Outsource-I/O):
For an algorithm Alg takes five inputs and produces three outputs, then Alg obeys the outsource input/output specification, i.e. Alg(x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 , x 5 )→(y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ). The first three inputs are generated by an honest party and classified by how much the adversary A=(E, U ) knows about them, where E represents the adversary environment and generates adversarial inputs for Alg, while U is an adversarial software in stead of U during the execution of T U . The first input x 1 is called the honest, secret input, which is unknown to both E and U ; the second input x 2 is called honest, protected input, which may be known by E, but is protected from U ; the third input x 3 is called honest, unprotected input, which may be known by both E and U . Besides, the last two inputs are adversarial-chosen inputs generated by the environment E, the fourth input x 4 is called adversarial, protected input, which is known to E, but protected from U , the last input x 5 VOLUME 7, 2019 is called adversarial, unprotected input, which may be known to both E and U . Similarly, the outputs are classified by how much the adversary A = (E, U ) knows about them, the first output called secret is unknown to both E and U ; the second is protected, which may be known to E but not U ; the last one is unprotected which could be known by both E and U .
It notes that the adversary A consists of two parties E and U . Both can only make direct communications before the execution of T U . In any other cases if necessary, they should be communicated via T . An algorithm Alg is outsourcesecure if neither party of A=(E, U ) can learn anything interesting during execution of T U , the requirement is captured by the simulatability of (T , U ). That is to say for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A=(E, U ), the view of U on the execution of T U can be simulated in a computationally indistinguishable way given the unprotected inputs, and the view of E can also be simulated given the protected and the unprotected inputs.
Definition 3(Outsource-Security [27] , [28] ): Let Alg be an algorithm with outsource-I /O. A pair of algorithm (T , U ) is said to be an outsource-secure implementation of Alg if:
1. Correctness: T U is a correct implementation of Alg. 2. Security: For all probability polynomial time adversary A = (E, U ), there exist probabilistic expected polynomialtime simulators (SIM E ,SIM U ) such that the following pairs of random variables are computationally indistinguishable.
• Pair One EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal -Real process as follows: ). The overall view of E in the real process is just its view in the last round (i.e.,i for which stop i = TRUE.) -ideal process as follows:
In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator SIM E who shielded from the secret input x i hs , but given the non-secret outputs that Alg produces when run all the inputs for round i, decides to either output the values (y i p ; y i u ) generated by Alg, or replace them with some other values (Y i p ; Y i u ). Note that this is captured by having the indicator variable rep i be a bit that determines whether y i p will be replaced with Y i p . In doing so, it is allowed to query oracle U ; moreover, U saves its state as in the real experiment.
• Pair Two UVIEW real ∼UVIEW ideal :
-The view that the untrusted U obtains by participating in the real process described in Pair One. UVIEW real = unstate i if stop i =TRUE.
-The ideal process:
In the ideal process, we have a stateful simulator SIM U , which equipped with only the unprotected inputs (x i hu , x i au ), queries U . As before, U may maintain state. Definition 4 (α-Efficient, Secure Outsourcing): A pair of algorithms (T , U ) are an α-efficient implementation of an algorithm Alg if 1) T U is an outsource-secure implementation of Alg.
2) ∀ inputs x, the running time of T is no more than α-multiplicative factor of the running time of Alg. Definition 5 (β-Checkable, Secure Outsourcing): A pair of algorithms (T , U ) are an β-checkable implementation of an algorithm Alg if 1) T U is an outsource-secure implementation of Alg.
2) ∀ inputs x, if U deviates from the advertised functionality during the execution of T U , T can detect it with probability at least β. Definition 6 (α, β-Outsourcing-Security): A pair of algorithms (T , U ) is an α, β-outsourcing-security if it both α-efficient and β-checkable.
III. SECURE OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM OF MODULAR EXPONENTIATIONS A. OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a secure outsourcing algorithm for modular exponentiation in one single untrusted server inspired by [27] and [28] , which is more suitable to outsource the encryption operations(e.g., u a or u a 1 u b 2 ) used in most of existing ABE schemes [13] , [16] to an untrusted computational server, hereafter this algorithm will be abbreviated as Exp. In algorithm Exp, a user(T ) can outsource the modular exponentiation computation to an untrust server(U ), in this process, U cannot learn any useful information about the inputs and outputs. Similar to [27] and [28] ,
We present Exp 1 and Exp 2 as follows, the Exp 1 (Algorithm1) is called outsource-secure algorithm of multi-based modular exponentiation, while the Exp 2 (Algorithm2) is called outsource-secure algorithm of single-based modular exponentiation As in the [27] , [28] , in order to speed up the computations, a subroutine named Rand will be invoked. The function of Rand is to generate a random, independent pair of the form (i, g i ) for each invocation, where i ∈ Z * p and g ∈ G. There are two methods to implement this functionality. One is the table-look up method, it means that generating a table T which contains random, independent pairs (i, g i ) in advance. The other is to apply the well-knowing preprocessing techniques, e.g., EBPV generator [30] , which runs in time O(log 2 n) for a n-bit exponent g n and is secure against adaptive adversaries.
Remark 1: The Algorithm1 has 2/5 probability to check the correctness of the calculation executed by U . U cannot distinguish the two queries(ie, U (ζ, g α 1 ), U (η, g α 2 )) from all of the five queries that T makes, if the U fails during 
where
x is a random value that x≥2 λ , λ is a security parameter, e.g., λ=64. Then T calculates (ω 1 ω −1
2 ) x . 4: Next, T runs Rand to obtain three pairs
. 5 : T queries server U in random order as:
; where
6: In the end, T checks the correct outputs of U , i.e.
if it does not hold, T outputs error, otherwise, T can compute:
2 ) dx mod p any execution of Exp 1 , it will be detected with probability 2/5. In practice, a user will query many times computing service from ESP, if the ESP cheats frequently, there is a high probability to detected the dishonest of server; Obviously, the Algorithm2 has 1/2 probability to check the correctness of the calculation executed by U .
Algorithm 2 Exp 2 (a, u)→u a 1: Let G be a cyclic group with the prime order p and g be a generator. Given an arbitrary base u ∈ R G and an arbitrary power a ∈ R Z * p . The output is u a mod p. The proposed Algorithm2 is given as follows: 2: T first runs Rand twice to get two blinding pairs (γ , g γ ) and (β, g β ). 3: The main trick is a more efficient solution to logically split u, a into random looking pieces that can be computed by U . Then the divisions are:
where ω = u/g γ , c = a − dx mod p, and d∈ R Z * p , x is a random value that x≥2 λ , λ is a security parameter, e.g., λ=64. Then T calculates u x . 4: Next, T runs Rand to obtain three pairs ((
). 5: T queries server U in random order as:
where ζ =(γ c − β)/α 1 mod p, η=(α 3 − ζ )/α 2 mod p. 6: In the end, T checks the correct outputs of U , i.e.
Remark 2: The Algorithm1 and Algorithm2 can be applied to scalar multiplication on elliptic curves, i.e. compute ag for a ∈ Z * p and g ∈ G, where G is a cyclic addition group on elliptic curves defined over a finite field GF(p). All of the elements like g a in the above Algorithms is written as ag, the details are omitted here.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Theorem 1:
In single untrusted program model, the Algorithm1 is a outsource-secure implementation of Exp, where the inputs (a, b;u 1 ,u 2 ) may be honest, secret; or honest, protected; or adversarial, protected, and all the bases are distinct.
The proof of the Algorithm1 is similar to [27] , [28] . The correctness is obviously if U performs honestly, here we mainly focus on the security. Let A = (E,U ) be a PPT adversary that interacts with the algorithm T in the oursourcesecurity model.
Firstly, we prove that EVIEW real ∼EVIEW ideal .(it means the adversary E learns nothing during the execution of T U )
If the input (a, b; u 1 , u 2 ) is honest, protected; or adversarial, protected, the simulator SIM E behaves the same way as in the real execution. If the input(a, b; u 1 , u 2 ) 
, SIM E saves the corresponding states. The input distributes to U in the real and ideal executions are computationally indistinguishable. In the real execution, the five inputs are randomly chosen by T and thus computationally indistinguishable from random, in the ideal execution, the inputs are chosen uniformly at random. If U behaves in an honest in the ith round, then EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal , this is because T U executes Algorithm1 in the real experiment and in the ideal experiment simulator SIM E doesn't change the output of Algorithm. If U give dishonest results, it will be detected by T and SIM E with probability 2 5 , resulting in an output of error • ; otherwise, the U will indeed be successful in manipulating the output of Algorithm1 with probability 3 5 . In the real experiment, the five outputs are multiplied together with a random value which is random to E. In the ideal experiment, SIM E simulates with a random r. then EVIEW real ∼EVIEW ideal even if U behaves maliciously in the ith round. By the hybrid argument, we can easily conclude that EVIEW real ∼ EVIEW ideal .
Next, we prove the Pair Two UVIEW real ∼ UVIEW ideal . The simulator SIM U acts as follows: it ignores the inputs in the ith round and instead chooses random five queries of the form (τ i , g µ i ) to U . Then SIM U saves its own states and the sates of U . We should note that E can distinguish between real and ideal experiments, but E can not communicate this information to U (note that the output in the ideal is never spoiled). In the real experiment in ith round, T always rerandomizes its inputs to U . In the ideal experiment, SIM U always chooses queries for U independently and randomly. Thus, we prove UVIEW real ∼ UVIEW ideal in each round i. By the hybrid argument, we can easily conclude that UVIEW real ∼UVIEW ideal .
Theorem 2: In single untrusted program model, the Algo-
) outsource-secure implementation of Exp 1 , where n denotes the number of bits of the exponent a, x is the random value that x ≥ 2 λ , where λ is a security parameter, e.g., λ = 64. Our proof is similar to [27] , [28] 
2 ) x as described in Algorithm1, it takes roughly 1.5logx modular multiplications by the well-known square-and-multiply method to calculate it). Besides, it takes O(1) or O(log 2 n) modular multiplications using the tablelook up or EBPV method [30] , where n is the bit of the a. On the other hand, it takes roughly 1.5n modular multiplications to calculate u a by the well-known square-and-multiply method, then the algorithm
Because U can not distinguish the two test queries from all five queries made by T . If U fails during any execution of Exp 1 , it will be detected with a probability 2 )outsource-secure. We can easily prove the theorem by the same method as the Theorem1 and Theorem2.
C. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare our proposed Algorithm1 and Algorithm2 with the corresponding algorithms in [27] , [28] . TABLE 1 presents the comparison of the computational efficiency on the outsourcer T side, the checkability, security model and other properties between the Algorithm1 and the corresponding algorithms that in [27] , [28] . TABLE 2 presents the comparison of corresponding properties between the Algorithm2 and the corresponding algorithms in [27] , [28] . Note that M denotes a modular multiplication, inversion denotes a modular inverse, and Invoke denotes an invocation of the subroutine Rand. We also omit other operations such as modular additions in those algorithms. Compared with [27] , our algorithm is implemented in single untrusted server model which is the same as in [28] , while [27] is implemented in two untrusted server model. Compared with [28] , the interactions between the user and the computation server are less than that in [28] . Then our algorithm is more suitable to ABE system in the term of computation and communication cost on the user side. Note that the modular exponentiation is the most basic operation in discrete-logarithm based cryptographic protocols, and millions of such computations may be outsourced to the server every day. Thus, our proposed algorithm can save huge of computational resources for both the outsourcer T and the servers U . 
IV. MODEL OF ABE-VOED AND THE SECURITY DEFINITION
In this section, we present the model of ABE-VOED based on the Algorithm1 and Algorithm2, and the security definition of ABE-VOED.
A. ABE-VOED SCHEME MODEL
Let A denotes an access policy and S represents a set of attributes, (I key , I enc ) denotes that the inputs of the keygen algorithm and the encryption algorithm, respectively, if the scheme is CP-ABE scheme (I key ,I enc ):=(S,A), else in a KP-ABE scheme(I key ,I enc ):=(A,S).
Our scheme is based on the Waters's scheme [3] , our scheme contains a additional ESP when compared with existing ABE [3] , [10] - [12] , we can apply our technique to the most of the existing ABE schemes [3] , [10] - [12] . Our framework as shown in FIGURE 1.
Definition 4 (Syntax of the ABE-VOED):
The model includes five algorithms as follows:
• Setup(U)→(PK , MSK ) The setup algorithm takes as input a attributes set U involved in the system, It outputs public keys PK and master secret key MSK .
• Keygen(PK , MSK , I key )→(SK ). The key generation algorithm takes as input the PK , the MSK and user's attributes set I key ∈U, then it outputs a private SK for user.
• Encryption(PK , M , I enc , M)→CT . This encryption algorithm ran by the DO under the cooperation of ESP. it takes as input PK , a data M, the intermediate ciphertext CT intermediate are generated with the Algorithm1 and Algorithm2 under the cooperation of ESP(outsourcing part of encryption task to ESP), and the I enc is an access policy A, then outputs a ciphertext CT .
• GenTK This algorithm executed by DO, it takes input the private key SK , it outputs two transformation key TK 1 , TK 2 and corresponding retrieving key RK 1 , RK 2 .
• Transform(CT , TK ) This algorithm ran by DSP 1 and DSP 2 , respectively. DSP i takes as input a CT and a transformation key TK i , i=1, 2, and outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext CT [i] ,i=1, 2.
• Check Correctness This algorithm takes input the CT [i] and RK i , then it check the correctness of the computing by DSP i , for i=1, 2. If the check result is yes, outputs a ciphertext CT * ; Otherwise, outputs ⊥.
• Decryption The decryption algorithm takes as input a private SK , a ciphertext CT , a partially decrypted cipher-VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. The system model of our scheme.
text CT * , then outputs the data M , if the f (I key , I enc ) = 1, else, it outputs ⊥.
B. SCHEME SECURITY DEFINITION
In the system, we considered two types of adversaries as follows:
• Type-I adversary: A group of curious users who are able to access private keys for theirself, and aim to decrypt ciphertext intended for users not in the group.
• Type-II adversary: The curious users collude with encryption service provider who can potential obtain access private keys for all the corrupted users, the encryption parameters information and partial ciphertext, etc. Thus, we follow the replayable chosenciphertext attack(RCCA) in [31] and define RCCA security game for our scheme. RCCA Security Game for Type-I
• Setup. The challenger runs Setup(U) and gives the public key PK to the adversary.
• Phase 1.The challenger initializes an integer j=0, initializes an empty • Guess. Adversary outputs a guess b of b. RCCA Security Game for Type-II
• Setup. The challenger runs Setup(λ, U) and gives the publics key PK to the adversary.
• Phase 1.The challenger initializes an integer j = 0, initializes an empty • Phase 2 Phase 2 is as like phase 1 but with the restriction that adversary can not query O Decryption out (j, CT ) which output either M 0 or M 1 .
• Guess. Adversary outputs a guess b of b. Defination 7 (RCCA): A CP-ABE or KP-ABE scheme with outsourced encryption is secure against replayable chosenciphertext attack if no polynomial time adversaries have a non-negligible advantage in the RCCA security games defined above.
Note that, we can definite CPA-secure model if we remove the decryption queries in the Phase 1 and Phased 2 in the above two games; It is a selective secure model if we add an Init stage before setup where the adversary commits to the challenge access structure I enc . We will prove our scheme in the selective security model.
V. OUR CONSTRUCTION A. CONSTRUCTION
The ABE-VOED is based on the scheme [3] (note that we can build our scheme based on most of the existing CP-ABE or KP-ABE schemes), the Algorithm1 and Algorithm2. The Setup, Keygen and Decryption algorithms are same with [3] , the main difference between [3] and our scheme are the encryption phase and the decryption phase. In the FIGURE 2 we give the working process of our construction. The details of ABE-VOED are described as follows:
• Setup(U) The setup algorithm takes as input a universe U of attributes that is involved in the system, it then chooses a group G of prime order p, a generater g of G and a hash function H : {0, 1} * →Z * p which will map any attributes described as binary string to a random group element in Z * p . In addition, it also chooses random exponents α, a∈ Z * p . then it outputs the PK , MSK as follows:
The authority sets the MSK as g α .
• Keygen(PK , MSK , I key ) The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK , the MSK and the I key ∈U, where I key is an attribute set S. Firstly, the algorithm chooses a random t∈Z * p . It generates the private key SK as:
• Encryption(PK , M, (M , ρ)) This algorithm are executed by DO under the cooperation of ESP, recall that DO is the T , ESP is the U as described in Algorithm1 and Algorithm2, when a DO(T ) wants to encrypt message M with an LSSS access structure(M , ρ), the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes, M is an ×n matrix. DO chooses a random s∈Z * p , and chooses a random vector ν=(s, y 2 , y 3 , , , y n )∈Z n P , these values will be used to share the encryption exponent s. It calculates
, where M i is the vector corresponding to the ith row of M . In addition, the DO chooses random r 1 ,...r ∈Z p , then the ciphertext CT = {C = Me(g, g) αs , C = g s , We note that for each C i :
, then queries ESP(U ) in random order as follows:
as described in Algorithm1.
where d i , r i are random chosen from Z * p , x is random value such that x≥2 λ , ie. λ=64, and calculates (ω 1 ω
−1
2 ) x (note that for each computation of C i , the (ω 1 ω
2 ) x is invariable, DO(T ) computes it only once in the process of computing
Then ESP(U ) sends this five outputs T out to DO(T ). where
• Checkability Finally, the DO(T ) can check the the correctness of the outputs from ESP(U ), if
then it indicates that ESP performs honestly, and DO(T ) can compute
Otherwise, it indicates that ESP(U ) has produced wrong responses, and thus DO(T ) output ''error''.
We can compute the D i =g r i with the Algorithm2: Exp 2 (r i ; g)→g r i , the details are omitted here. As described in Algorithm2, DO(T ) will also compute once modular exponentiation(g x ) and some multiplication operations. At last, DO can get:
Finally, it outputs the whole ciphertext CT = {C = Me(g, g) αs , C = g s ,
Note that: In this encryption phase, DO uses the Algorithm1 and Algorithm2 to outsource the computation task of CT intermediate to ESP, and only computes two modular exponentiations and O( ) multiplications, and the cost of checking process is once multiplication operation. In total, DO only compute 4 modular exponentiations(C, C , (ω 1 ω −1
2 ) x , g x ) and O( ) multiplications in encryption phase.
• GenTK(SK ) This algorithm takes input the private key SK =(K , L, K x ), x∈S, it randomly chooses two values z 1 , z 2 ∈ Z * p , and chooses a K j in K x , note that the attribute j∈S must be a necessary one to fully decrypt the CT . Then it generates two transformation key TK 1 and TK 2 , and the corresponding retrieving key are RK 1 and RK 2 , respectively. At last, the user sent the TK 1 and TK 2 to DSP 1 and DSP 2 , respectively. Where
• Transform out (CT , TK 1 , TK 2 , PK ) DSP i , for i=1,2 runs this algorithm with the input PK , CT and the corresponding key TK i , for i = 1, 2, respectively. Then outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext
If the attributes set S=I key satisfies the access structure (M , ρ), let I ⊂ {1, 2... } be defined as I ={i : ρ(i) ∈ S}, let {ω i ∈Z p } i∈I be a set of constants such that
are valid shares of any secret s according to M , then i∈I ω i λ i = s. Upon receiving the CT and the TK 1 ,DSP 1 computes:
in the same way, DSP 2 computes:
Then the user get the transformed ciphertext as CT =(CT [1] , CT [2] ) Check Correctness(RK [1] , RK [2] , CT [1] , CT [2] , PK ) This algorithm takes input the CT [i] and RK i , then it check the correctness of the computing by DSP i , for i=1, 2. The details as follows: First, user inputs the pre-selected attribute j corresponding the key K j , D j and ω j and the RK 1 =z 1 and RK 2 =z 1 z 2 , computing as follows:
Then, input the CT [1] , CT [2] and corresponding RK 1 and RK 2 , check the equation:
If the equation is not equal, it outputs ⊥; otherwise, it is to say the outputs done by DSP 1 and DSP 2 are correct, then it outputs CT * =CT [1] B [1] C 0 (or CT [2] B [2] C 0 )=e(g, g) αs .
In fact, the validation process is as follows:
If the Check Correctness algorithm outputs CT * , the decryption algorithm takes as input the CT * and the CT then, it computes M = C/CT * , it outputs the message M; otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Finally, completely decrypt the ciphertext as follows:
Our construction is based on the scheme [3] , the difference between [3] and our scheme is that data encryption phase, the proof method of our scheme is same with [3] . Theorem 4: The construction of ABE-VOED without outsourced decryption scheme is indistinguishable secure against chosen-plaintext attack in the security definition model modified in the section III.B under DBDH assumption.
We will prove that our scheme is secure against both Type-I and Type-II adversaries. Note that the main difference between Type-I and Type-II is the oracle provided, specifically, Type-I adversary is provided with O SK (·), while Type-II is provided with O Enc (·) and O SK (·).
Type-I adversary, which is same as the proof of [abe m]. We will proof that if it exist an adversary A with nonnegligible advantage in the security definition modified in the section III, we can build a simulator B that plays the decisional q-parallel BDHE problem.
• Init. The simulator is given a q-parallel BDHE challenge y, T . Then the adversary provide a challenge access structure (M * , ρ * ), where M * has n * columns.
• Setup. The simulator chooses random α * ∈ Z p and set α = α * + a q+1 by letting e(g, g) α = e(g a , g a q )e(g, g) a * . We describe the group elements h 1 , ..., h U as follows:
where z x R ←− Z p for 1 ≤ x ≤ U , X is the set of indices i, such that ρ * (i) = x. Note that, the h x ∈ G are distributed randomly elements duo to the random value g z x and if X = ∅, then h x = g z x .
• Phase1 In this phase the adversary give a private key query for a set S which does not satisfy M * , the simulator first chooses a random value r ∈ Z p and finds a vector ω = (ω 1 , ..., ω n * ) where ω = −1 and ω · M * i = 0 for (i | ρ * (i) ∈ S), note that the vector must be exist by the definition of a LSSS, if not, the vector (1,...,0) would be in the span of S. Then the simulator implicitly
Note that g at contains a term of g −a q+1 , which will cancel out with the unknown term in g α , next we will calculate K x ∀ ∈ S, we let K x = L z x for (x ∈ S|there is no ρ * (i) = x). The difficult obstacle is to create K x for (x ∈ S|ρ * (i) = x), note that K x = h t x may contain the form g a q+1 /b i that we can not simulate. However, all of these terms cancel for M * i ω = 0, then the simulator creates K x for (x ∈ S|there is no ρ * (i) = x) as follows:
where X = (i|ρ * (i) = x).
• Challenge. In this phase, the adversary Asubmits two challenge message M 0 andM 1 to simulator. The simulator flips a random cion θ . Then it creates C=M θ T · e(g s , g α ) and C = g s . However, the difficult is to create the C i since value contains terms that must cancel out. The simulator will choose random y 2 , ..., y n * and use the vector υ=(s, sa+y 2 , sa 2 +y 3 , ..., sa n * −1 +y n * ) to share the secret s. Now, the simulator chooses random values r 1 , ..., r and creates the challenge ciphertext components as follows:
• Phase2. This phase is same as phase 2 with the restrict that the adversary can not issue query I key to O I key (·) where f (I key , I enc ) = 1.
• Guess. The adversary will outputs a guess ν of ν. If ν = ν , then the simulator outputs 0 to guess that T = e(g, g) a q+1 s , it is to say that CT is a normal ciphertext, so the adversary has a non-negligible to guess out ν = ν ; otherwise, it outputs 1 to indicate that T is a random group element in G T . When T is random element in G T , then the message M ν is random value to adversary, then Pr[B(y, T =R) = 0] = Type-II adversary. Because the different between Type-II and Type-I is that the former can query both O SK (·) and O Enc (·), the theorem1 indicates that the adversary can not get anything information about the inputs (a,b,u 1 ,u 2 )=(λ i ,−r i ,g a ,g H (att(i)) ), it is to say that the view of Type-II adversary is the same as the view of Type-I adversary, it means that if the Type-II adversary can win the game with a non-negligible advantage, then the Type-I adversary can also win the game1 with a nonnegligible advantage, this leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 5: If the construction of ABE-VOED without outsourced decryption scheme is selectively CPA-secure, then the above construction of ABE-VOED is selectively CPA-secure.
Assume that there exists an adversary A can broke the construction of ABE-VOED with a non-negligible advantage in the selectively CPA-secure model, then we will build a algorithm B which can attack the basic construction ABE-VOED without outsourced decryption with a non-negligible advantage in the selectively CPA-secure model.
Let C be the challenger corresponding to B in the selectively CPA-secure model of the ABE-VOED without decryption. B interact with A execute the following steps:
• Init The adversary A gives B the challenge access policy I enc , then B sends it to C as it challenge access policy, after that B gives the PK of the basic ABE-VOED to B.
• Setup B sends the PK to the adversary A.
• Phase1 B initializes a 
and returns to A the transformation key TK . Note that, B does not know the actual retrieving key RK =(α/z, z 1 ).
• Challenge The adversary A submits two equal length message M 0 , M 1 and I * enc . B sends them to C to obtain the ciphertext CT * . after that, B sends CT * to the adversary A as it challenge ciphertext. -Query phase2 A adaptively makes SK queries as in the Query phase1 with the restriction that the set of attributes I key which can not satisfy the access policy I enc .
• Guess The adversary A outputs a bit β . B also outputs β . Then if A can attack the construction of ABE-VOED with outsourced decryption in the selectively CPA-secure model with a non-negligible advantage, then we build β can attack the construction of ABE-VOED without outsourced decryption in the selectively CPA-secure model with non-negligible advantage.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the efficiency of our scheme, and compare the property and performance of our scheme with the original CP-ABE scheme [3] and the sate-of-the-art [8] , [10] - [12] in TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 , respectively. First, only the work [8] is similar to our work which delegate the encryption task to server, but it cannot be able to check the correctness of the outputs done by ESP. The schemes [11] , [12] are ABE schemes with outsourced decryption, and the scheme [3] is original CP-ABE scheme. In TABLE 3, only our proposed scheme satisfies checkable both outsource encryption and decryption.
In TABLE 4 , we present the comparison of the efficiency between [3] , [8] , [10] - [12] and our scheme, we use Exp to denote a modular exponentiation, | | and |ω| denote the attribute numbers in the policy and the number of user attributes, respectively. Compared with [3] , [10] , and [11] , as described in Section our scheme is superior in efficiency on the computation cost of DO in encryption phase, DO need to compute 4Exp and O(| |) multiplications in encryption phase, which is almost constant and not growing with the attributes numbers in the policy of the ciphertext. While the encryption cost in [3] and [10] is growing linearly with the number of attributes in the access policy, because the ciphertext CT in 3 and [10] - [12] is the type of (C, C , C i , D i ), for i = 1, ...N , where N is the number of attributes in the access policy, and all the items of CT are computed by DO in [3] , [10] , and [11] . Compared with [8] , the encryption cost on the DO side in our scheme has a little weak advantage than [8] , the DO also computes 4Exp in [8] . As described in Algorithm1, DO computes (ω 1 ω −1
2 ) x and u x , where x is a random value such that x≥2 λ λ is a security parameter, e.g., λ=64, then the compute time is small than modular exponentiations(g s and H (att(i) s , where s∈Z * p , p is 160bit prime) that in [8] . Besides, as the mentioned above, Li et al. [8] is secure under the assumption that at least two servers(ESP) are trustworthy, while our assumption is that the ESP can be untrusted, we can check the correctness of the outputs done by ESP. Actually, we deliver the exponentiation computation to ESP and check the correct of computation done by ESP. Regard to outsource decryption, the blinding key cost on user side is reduced to 2Exp in our scheme, while the transformation key cost on user side is growing with the number of attributes associated with user's private key in [11] and [12] , because the transformation key TK =SK z are generated by blinding all items of private key SK =(K , L, K i ) with a random value z.
B. EXPERIMENTAL PERFORMANCE
In this section, we provide experimental evaluation of our scheme and other schemes on two hardware experimental platforms. In order to explain the necessary of outsourcing encryption, we present the experimental evaluation of our scheme and other schemes without outsourcing encryption [3] , [8] . Besides, to explain the advantage of the transformation key cost in our scheme, we give the comparison of generating transformation key cost between our scheme and other schemes [11] , [12] . Our hardware experimental platform consists of two types, one is Intel, another is 'mobile platform environment simulated on desktop', abbreviated MPES, whose computation ability is similar to a smart phone or mobile device. More specifically, our experiments are conducted on an Intel Core i3-4170 CPU@3.70GHz×2 processor with 3.2GB RAM running 64-bit ubuntu 16.04LTS and python 3.5.2 under the virtual machine, and on an Intel Core i3-4170 CPU@1.80GHz×2 processor with 1.9GB RAM running 64-bit ubuntu 16.04LTS and python 3.5.2 under the virtual machine which simulates the mobile platform environment.
In order to evaluate the performance of our scheme and other ABE schemes [3] , [8] , [10] - [12] , we implement our scheme in software based on the library [13] and using a 224-bit MNT elliptic curve from the Stanford Pairing-Based Crypto library [33] . All of the implementation based on the MNT curve implies the use of asymmetric, a small change need to be made on our scheme of symmetric setting in the implementation. Generally speaking, in a CP-ABE scheme, the decryption and the encryption time impacted by the complexity of the ciphertext policy, then, without loss of generality, we generate the ciphertext policies in the form of (A 1 or A 2 ) AND (A 3 or A 4 )...AND (A N −1 or A N ) , and generate 5 distinct policies in this form with N=10,30,50,70,100. We repeat each experiment 50 times on the desktop computer and 50 times on the MPES and take the average values as the experimental results. In order to realize reduce the computational burden of DO, user delegates the decryption computation to a DSP. In fact, decryption computation cost of user and DSP in total is more than the original ABE scheme, the reason for this is that some additional computation is paid for preserving privacy.
As shown in the FIGURE 3(a), which illustrates that the efficiency comparison between our scheme and [3] , [8] , [10] , and [11] in the setup phase, our scheme cost in the setup reduces to constant as in [10] , because the authority will generate the public keys associated with attributes in [3] , [10] , and [11] , e.g., h i ...h U , while authority public a hash function H in our scheme; FIGURE 3(b) shows the encryption phase efficiency(on the Intel and MPES) comparison between our construction and other ABE schemes. Compared with [8] , as the analysis shows in Section uppercase IV.A, our scheme has a little advantage in encryption cost than that in [8] , but our scheme can verify the computation do by ESP, while [8] has no this property. Compared with [3] and [10] - [12] , no matter implemented on Intel or MPES, our construction encryption cost on the DO side grows close to zero as the number of attributes in the policy increases, when the attributes number N=100, the encryption cost on the DO side is 70ms on the desktop and 240ms on the MPES, respectively. While the corresponding cost on the DO side is growing linearly with the complexity of the ciphertext policy in [3] and [10] - [12] , the encryption cost on the DO side is almost 2 seconds and 4 seconds on the desktop in [3] and [11] , respectively, and is about 9 seconds and 13 seconds on the MPES in [3] and [11] , respectively. Then, due to the most of the operations done by ESP, our scheme is more suitable for mobile users. Thus our construction can be equally applied to mobile devices in practice.
Regarding to decryption phase, FIGURE 3(c)(d) present the comparison of generating the transformation key cost and final decryption cost between our construction and other schemes, no matter on Intel or MPES, the transformation key generation and final decryption cost in our construction is lower than in [11] and [12] . The time implemented on mobile platform is more than 3 seconds with 100 attributes, while the time in our construction is reduced to a constant(ms level), which is not growing with the number of attributes associated with user's private key.
Generally, compared with [3] , [8] , and [10] - [12] , our construction achieves some advantages in encryption and decryption computational cost, respectively, which indicates that our scheme is more suitable for the mobile device in practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we think about a new requirement of ABE with outsourced encryption-verifiability. we propose a secure outsourcing algorithm for exponentiation modulo a prime in one untrusted program model, based on this algorithm, we propose an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced both encryption and decryption. Besides, in this paper, we also reduce the transformation key cost on the user side into a constant. In the end, we present the security and the efficiency analysis of our scheme. Extensive analysis and the experimental results indicate that our scheme is secure and highly efficient for mobile devices in terms of computation overhead. QIAOYAN WEN received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in mathematics from Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an, China, in 1981 and 1984, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in cryptography from Xidian University, Xi'an, in 1997. She is currently a Professor with the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications. Her current research interests include coding theory, cryptography, information security, the internet security, and applied mathematics. VOLUME 7, 2019 
